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: Case No. 20020146-CA 
RICHARD LYLE HOBBS, 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because Hobbs was charged under the entire aggravated robbery statute, he was 
entitled to defend in ijill. This Court should reject the State's effort to "narrow" the issue of 
Hobbs' entitlement to a good faith defense to only half of the statutory definition. 
The enactment of the 1973 Utah Code did not wholly abrogate the common law. 
Because the Model Penal Code, upon which the Utah Code was patterned, and because the 
Utah Code itself do not evince any intent to abolish common law concepts of animus furandi 
and the good faith defense, the pre-1973 decisions continue to be persuasive. Assuming this 
were not the case, the Utah Code requires proof of animus furandi and provides a good faith 
defense, and the trial court erred in failing to recognize this. 
The trial court erred in finding that evidence of Hughes' history of cheating Mr. 
Hobbs and his other employees was inadmissible. This evidence was pertinent to the issues 
of animus furandi and Hobbs' good faith, and also bore on Hughes' bias or motive in 
testifying as he did, that Hobbs' efforts to collect his wages were a robbery. Defense counsel 
did not lead the court into error on this point, but successfully informed the court about why 
the evidence should have been admitted. 
The jury instructions given by the trial court were erroneous. The absence of an 
accurate elements instruction is plain error under Utah law, regardless of whether a separate 
instruction accurately defines the offense at issue. In this case, the robbery statute did not 
accurately define robbery, confirming that reversal is in order. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THIS COURT SHOIJLp DECIDE THE ISSUES OF HOBBS' ENTITLEMENT 
TO PROOF OF ANIMUS FURANDI AND TO A GOOD FAITH DEFENSE 
ON THE BASIS OF THE WHOLE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
AND ROBBERY STATUTES. 
The State argues that this Court should decide the issue of Hobbs' entitlement to proof 
of animus furandi and to a good faith defense on the basis of subsection (a) of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-301,! because the jury was not instructed under subsection (b). State's brief at 
Subsection 76-6-301 provides, 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or 
attempts to take personal property in the possession of another 
from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or 
fear of immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if 
it occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the 
immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
2 
8. Given the wanting nature of the final jury instructions, Mr. Hobbs was not properly 
convicted of any variation of aggravated robbery.2 More importantly, by consulting the 
charging document, the information, the Court can readily confirm that the charge against 
Hobbs was general, and not narrowed to one subsection. Count 2 of the information stated 
as follows: 
Count 2: 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a FIRST DEGREE FELONY, in violation of 
Section 76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said 
defendant, on or about June 29, 2001 at Grand County, Statt of Utah, in the 
course of committing robbery, did use a dangerous weapon. 
(R. 2). 
While a pretrial defense memorandum indicated that it appeared that the prosecution 
apparently was not relying on the theft subsection of the robbery statute (R0130, n.l), the 
State never moved to amend the aggravated robbery count of the information, and the State 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
2The final instructions began with a general allegation of aggravated robbery (R. 
141), and the elements instruction did not specify any of the elements of robbery at all (R. 
142). 
The robbery definition instruction included some, but not all of the elements of 
subsections (a) and (b), stating, 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking or attempted taking of personal 
property from another, from his person or in his immediate presence, by means 
of force or fear. Personal property means anything of value other than land. 
I can not assert as a defense to a charge of robbery that I believe that the other 
person owes me money. 
(R. 143). 
See discussion at pages 21 to 22 and 35 of the Opening Brief of Appellant. 
3 
never filed a bill of particulars narrowing the charge. At the preliminary hearing, neither the 
State nor the magistrate articulated a specific, narrow theory for the aggravated robbery 
charge, or indicating in any fashion that the charge was resting solely on subsection (l)(a) 
(R. 177 at 5-6, 56-57). At the arraignment, Judge Anderson read only the general charge 
of aggravated robbery, to which Hobbs pled not guilty (R. 177 at 57). In opening statement, 
the prosecutor did not narrow the aggravated robbery charge (R. 178 at 73-79). In reading 
the information at the outset of the trial, the court clerk only read a general allegation of 
aggravated robbery under 76-6-302, without specifying a subsection or quoting from any 
specific statutory language (R. 177 at 69). Given that Hobbs was charged at the outset of the 
trial with aggravated robbery, and not with just one particular subsection of the robbery 
statute, he was entitled to defend in full against the entire aggravated robbery charge. See, 
e.g., Crane v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 683 (1985). 
Thus, in determining whether the trial court erred in forbidding a good faith defense 
to the aggravated robbery charge, and in relieving the State of its burden to prove animus 
fur audi, this Court should reject the State's argument that the Court should decide the 
question under only half of the robbery statute. 
A. DENYING THE ANIMUS FURANDI ELEMENT AND GOOD FAITH DEFENSE 
UNDER ONLY ONE SUBSECTION OF THE ROBBERY STATUTE WOULD BE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Assuming arguendo that Hobbs had been charged and convicted solely under 
subsection (b), as a matter of constitutional law, if robbery defendants charged under 
4 
subsection (b) were permitted a good faith defense and entitled to put the government to 
proof of animus furandi, while others charged under subsection (a) were not, this would risk 
unequal treatment of defendants, in violation of Article I § 24, the uniform operation of laws 
provision, and Article VI § 26, the proscription against special laws. See, generally, 
Greenwood v. Citv of Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 821 (Utah 1991)("Article I, section 24 
requires that a law must apply equally to all persons within a class and that statutory 
classifications must have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute."); 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989)(discussing Article I 
§ 24 and indicating that Article VI § 26 is generally viewed as the "flip side" of Article I § 
24). 
The constitutional problem posed by the State's proposed interpretation of the robbery 
statute is elucidated by reference to State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995), wherein the 
court struck down the juvenile direct filing provision, and in so doing described the unique 
application of the state constitutional uniform operation of laws provision, stating as follows: 
"[F]or a law to be constitutional under [the provision], it is not enough that it 
be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be 
uniform. A law does not operate uniformly if'persons similarly situated1 are 
not 'treated similarly1. . . ." Therefore, [the Court] must first determine what 
classifications, if any, are created by the statute. Second, [the Court] must 
determine whether different classes or subclasses are treated disparately. 
Finally, if any disparate treatment exists between classes or subclasses, we 
must determine whether the legislature had any reasonable objective that 
warrants the disparity. 
Id. at 997 (citations omitted, some brackets by the court). 
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In MohL the court rejected the State's argument that the juvenile direct filing 
provision served valid interests because the statute failed to direct prosecutorial discretion 
adequately. The court stated as follows in this regard: 
The State argues that the direct-file provision of the Act is reasonably related 
to the statutes stated purpose because there is a legitimate need to try certain 
violent juveniles as adults. We agree with the State's assertion of need but 
observe that the legislature has failed to specify which violent juveniles require 
such treatment, instead delegating that discretion to prosecutors who have no 
guidelines as to how it is to be exercised. Legitimacy of a goal cannot justify 
an arbitrary means. The State asserts that this problem is cured by the fact that 
prosecutors often have legitimate reasons for wanting to leave persons eligible 
for adult prosecution in juvenile court. But the statute does not require the 
prosecutor to have any reason, legitimate or otherwise, to support his or her 
decision of who stays in juvenile jurisdiction and who does not. Legitimacy in 
the purpose of the statute cannot make up for a deficiency in its design. Section 
78-3a-25 is wholly without standards to guide or instruct prosecutors as to 
when they should or should not use such influential powers. 
Id. 
In explaining why the direct file provision exceeded permissible bounds of 
prosecutorial discretion, the Mohi court stated, 
The elements of the offense are determined by the charging decision, and it is 
only the charging decision that is protected by traditional notions of prosecutor 
discretion. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 434 U.S. 357, 364, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 
98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (decisions of whether and which charges to prosecute are 
within prosecutors' realm of discretion; no decision made by prosecutors may 
be based on "arbitrary classifications"). Choosing which court to file charges 
in has significant consequences for the offender, and the statute does not 
indicate what characteristics of the offender mandate that choice. The scope 
for prosecutor stereotypes, prejudices, and biases of all kinds is simply too 
great. If it is the legislature's determination to have all members of a certain 
group of violent juveniles (such as repeat offenders, those who use guns, etc.) 
tried as adults, it is free to do so. However, the legislature may not create a 
scheme which permits the random and unsupervised separation of all such 
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violent juveniles into a relatively privileged group on the one hand and a 
relatively burdened group on the other. See Wayte v. United States. 470 U.S. 
598, 608, 84 L. Ed. 2d 547, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985) (prosecutor discretion is 
"limited"); United States v. Bourgeois. 964 F.2d 935, 938 (9th Cir.) 
(prosecutor discretion should not be "unfettered"), cert, denied. 121 L. Ed. 2d 
215, 113 S. Ct. 290 (1992); United States v. Mastroianni. 749 F.2d 900, 911 
(1 st Cir. 1984) (prosecutor discretion limited by fundamental conceptions of 
justice). 
Mohi at 1002-03 (footnotes omitted). Likewise, if some robbery defendants were permitted 
to put the government to its proof of animus furandi, and permitted to present good faith 
defenses, while others were subject to the serious consequences which follow convictions 
for robbery and aggravate^ robbery without the animus furandi element and availability of 
the good faith defense, this would violate Article I § 24. 
If only some defendants were entitled to the animus furandi element and good faith 
defense, and others were not, this would also violate Article I § 26, the special laws 
prohibition. As the court explained in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. the Utah 
Insurance Guarantee Association. 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977), 
A general law applies to and operates uniformly upon all members of any class 
of persons, places, or things requiring legislation peculiar to themselves in the 
matters covered by the laws in question. On the other hand, special legislation 
relates either to particular persons, places, or things or to persons, places, or 
things which, though not particularized, are separated by any method of 
selection from the whole class to which the law might, but for such legislation, 
be applied. 
... [A] law is general when it applies equally to all persons embraced in a class 
founded upon some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction. It is special 
legislation if it confers particular privileges or imposes peculiar disabilities, or 
burdensome conditions in the exercise of a common right; upon a class of 
persons arbitrarily selected, from the general body of those who stand in 
precisely the same relation to the subject of the law. 
7 
Id. at 864. 
Robberies by definition have always involved some variation of theft. See, e.g., 
Model Penal Code, Commentary on Robbery, Id. Part II. § 222.1, page 96 ( "At common law, 
the theft of property under circumstances calculated to terrorize the victim was denominated 
the more serious offense of robbery."). The two subsections of the current robbery statute 
in application would appear to involve some form of theft, defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-404 as follows: "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." The Utah Supreme 
Court has consistently recognized that theft is a lesser included offense of aggravated 
robbery. See, e.g., State v. McCovey. 803 P.2d 1234, 1237 and n.16 (Utah )(1990)(citing 
Utah cases for the proposition that "theft has been held to be a lesser included offense of 
aggravated robbery because theft, by its very nature, has elements that overlap aggravated robbery."). 
Because there is no rational, significant distinction between^the two subsections of the 
robbery statute which would justify granting the animus furandi element and good faith 
defense to only half of the robbery defendants, this Court should decline the State's invitation 
to withhold the element and defense under half of the robbery statute. 
II. 
UTAH LAW CONTINUES TO RECOGNIZE 
A GOOD FAITH DEFENSE TO ROBBERY, AND REQUIRES 
PROOF OF ANIMUS FURANDI 
A. THE 1973 AMENDMENT TO THE CODE DID NOT WHOLLY ABOLISH THE 
COMMON LAW. 
The State cites State v. Tuttle: 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986), for the propositions that 
8 
since 1973, Utah has abandoned common law crimes and defenses, and that People v. 
Hughes. 39 P. 492 (Utah 1895), and other pre-1973 cases requiring proof of animus furandi 
m robbery cases are obsolete. State's brief at 10-11. The Utah Code abolished common law 
crimes, but did not abolish common law defenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 
("Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, 
other applicable statute or ordinance."). Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103(1) ("(1) The 
provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses 
against any offense defined in this code or, except where otherwise specifically provided or 
the context otherwise requires, any offense defined outside this code; provided such offense 
was committed after th6 effective date of this code/'). 
As this Court can confirm, the Tuttle opinion recognizes that despite the fact that the 
Utah Code purports to supplant common law crimes, unless the code intentionally and 
discemibly rejected pre-existing common law precepts, reference to common law precedents 
continues to be appropriate and helpful. See id., 730 P.2d at 633.3 
3The Tuttle court explained, 
As noted, in enacting the new criminal code, the legislature abolished 
the common law of crimes. U.C.A, 1953, §§ 76-1-105 (Repl. Vol. 8B, 1978). 
Moreover, because section 76-2-302 is based on the Model Penal Code and not 
on the common law, it does not necessarily bring in its train all the baggage 
constituting the common law duress defense. The legislature's expressed intent 
to abandon the common law of crimes and replace it with the new code might 
suggest we should not resort to common law precedents that would have been 
pertinent to interpretation of our pre-1973 criminal statutes when faced with 
a situation not covered by the current code. That argument is persuasive when 
the new criminal code differs substantially from the old statutorily enacted 
common law and the reason for the difference is discernible. However, where 
the differences appear to be largely technical and we can discern no purpose 
for the diversion from the prior law, we should be free to refer to it for such 
interpretive 
assistance as it may offer. See 1 Wharton's Criminal Law §§ 9 n.18 (1978). It 
would be foolish to ignore all the evolutionary experience represented by the 
common law simply because modern draftsmen have rewritten the old law in 
plainer language. See Crawford, Statutory Construction §§ 228, at 427 (1940). 
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In Tuttle, the court superimposed common law elements on the duress defense set 
forth in the code in the context of prison escapes, finding there was no evidence of intent in 
the Model Penal Code, after which the Utah Code was patterned, and no evidence of 
legislative intent to abandon the "subtle yet sound" common law precepts in that context. 
See id. 
Likewise in the context of robbery, there is no evidence that the drafters of the Model 
Penal Code intended to do away with the concept ofanimus furandi, or with the good faith 
defense. The Model Penal Code recognizes that all robberies are aggravated thefts, 
explaining in the commentary on robbery that "[a]t common law, the theft of property under 
circumstances calculated to terrorize the victim was denominated the more serious offense 
of robbery." Id. Part II. § 222.1, page 96. 
The robbery subsection of the Model Penal Code, §221.1 includes theft as an element 
of all robberies, providing as follows: 
(1) Robbery Defined. A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of 
committing a theft, he: 
(a) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(b) threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear 
of immediate serious bodily injury; or 
(c) commits or threatens immediately to commit any 
felony of the first or second degree. 
An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs 
in an attempt to commit theft or in flight after the attempt or commission. 
Id. 
10 
(2) Grading. Robbery is a felony of the second degree, except that it is 
a felony of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor 
attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious 
bodily injury. 
The Model Penal Code's theft provisions expressly recognize the concept of animus 
furandi by requiring proof that the property at issue is property "of another," and expressly 
provide for a good faith defense. Section 223.0, the definition section, states in relevant part, 
In this Article, unless a different meaning plainly is required, 
(1) "deprive" means: (a) to withhold property of another permanently 
or for so extended a period as to appropriate a major portion of its economic 
value, or with intent to restore only upon payment of reward or other 
compensation; ou(b) to dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that 
the owners will recover it. 
Model Penal Code, Part II, § 223.0(1) (emphasis added). 
Section 223.1 of the Model Penal Code specifically recognizes a good faith defense 
to theft offenses, stating, 
(3) Claim of Right. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for theft 
that the actor: 
(a) was unaware that the property or service was that of 
another; or 
(b) acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved or that he had a right to acquire or dispose of it as he did; or 
(c) took property exposed for sale, intending to purchase 
and pay for it promptly, or reasonably believing that the owner, 
if present, would have consented. 
Model Penal Code, Part II, § 223.1(3), page 126. 
Just as there is no intent to abandon concepts of animus furandi and good faith 
defenses in robbery cases evident in the Model Penal Code, the Utah legislature's 
replacement of the requirement of a felonious taking with the requirement of an unlawful 
11 
taking in the 1973 definition of robbery does not clearly evince legislative intent to diverge 
from the common law, but appears to reflect a "largely technical" change. Cf. Juttle. 
Likewise, the Utah theft statute requires proof of the exercise of "unauthorized control 
over the property of another" (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404), and theft continues to be an 
element of robbery (see, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301, supra n.l), as it has been for 
years, (see Model Penal Code commentary, Part II, § 222.1, page 96 ("At common law, the 
theft of property under circumstances calculated to terrorize the victim was denominated the 
more serious offense of robbery."). See also State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1237 and 
n.16 (Utah )(1990)(citing Utah cases for the proposition that "theft has been held to be a 
lesser included offense of aggravated robbery because theft, by its very nature, has elements 
that overlap aggravated robbery.")). 
Accordingly, Hughes and its progeny continue to be persuasive. See Turtle. See also 
state, v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 862 (Utah 1996)(in distinguishing offenses of aggravated 
burglary and aggravated robbery, court stated, "Aggravated burglal-y always requires proof 
that the defendant entered or remained in a building;, n o v a t e d robbery always requires 
r ^ f that the d e f i a n t took another's r>roperty."XEmphasis added).4 
The State seeks to distinguish State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 962 (Utah 1996), which 
indicates that "aggravated robbery always requires proof that the defendant took another s 
property " by noting that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101(3) states "'Property' is that of another, 
if anyone other than the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest in any portion thereof. 
State's brief at 19. 
Brooks distinguished between aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, and did 
not involve any contest as to who owned the property, and did not discuss the application of 
Here, where Hobbs contended that the money at issue was rightfully his (T. 189-195), 
he did not attempt to take the property of another under either Brooks or 76-6-103(3). 
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B. DURANT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING. 
The State contends that State v. Durant 674 P.2d 638 (Utah 1983), is the case most 
on point which defeats Hobbs' argument that the code requires proof of animus fur audi and 
permits a good faith defense to robbery charges. State's brief at 11-12. It is questionable 
whether the Durant case is properly viewed as "on point" in a robbery case, because Durant 
is an arson case which analyzes the historical development of the law of arson in Utah. 
See id. at 639-642. Assuming that Durant is apposite to this case, Durant confirms that the 
trial court erred in denying Hobbs' good faith defense and in relieving the government of its 
burden to prove animus furandi. 
In Durant, the defendant contended that the courts should interpret the aggravated 
arson statute as requiring proof that the property burned belonged to someone other than the 
owner. While the language of the aggravated arson statute did not require proof that the 
property burned was that of another, the defendant contended that the courts should construe 
the requirement of an "unlawful" burning as requiring proof that the person who burned the 
property did not own it, in consonance with the common law arson element that the property 
burned be that of another. Id. at 639. 
After discussing at length how Utah law historically had imposed severe punishment 
for arson because arson endangers people, and did not focus primarily on who owned the 
property, the court turned to the proper interpretation of the word "unlawfully" in the 
aggravated arson statute. The court noted that the word was not defined by the code, but 
apparently meant "without justification, license or privilege," based on the 1978 version of 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3).5 Durant at 641. The Durant court noted that a property 
owner might lawfully burn his own property by obtaining the necessary permits from local 
authorities, notifying the fire department and neighbors, and having an adequate water 
nearby. Id, at 641-42. Assuming that the definition of unlawful recognized in Durant were 
applicable here, by requiring the government to prove that a robbery is unlawful, section 76-
6-301 requires the government to show that the person who took or attempted to take the 
property had no license, justification or privilege to do so. Cf. id. 
A property owner's right to exercise dominion and control over and defend his own 
property is one of the most basic rights, licenses, privileges or justifications recognized by 
our law. As the first section of our state bill of rights, Constitution of Utah, Article I § 1, 
recognizes, 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend 
their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship 
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest 
against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely 
their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
(Emphasis added). Because property owners are entitled to possess and defend their 
property, they cannot unlawfully take it or attempt to take it in a robbery under § 76-6-301. 
5This provision stated, 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when 
the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not 
open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged 
to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof. 
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The State cites State v. Gardiner. 914 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1983), for the proposition 
that the "only defenses available are those specified by statute." State's brief at 13. To the 
extent that the Utah Code is the only source of criminal defenses, (see Tuttle. supra, 
(adopting the contours of the common law duress defense in the context of prison cases)), 
the legislature expressly recognizes a good faith defense to theft charges, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-402(3), and incorporates theft in the definition of robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
301(l)(b). Compare Gardiner (code provides no right to resist unlawful arrest or search). 
C. THE GOOD FAITH DEFENSE AND ANIMUS FURANDI ELEMENT IN THE THEFT 
STATUTE DO APPLY UNDER THE ROBBERY STATUTE. 
The State argues that the good faith defense provided by Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
402(3)(a) applies only to thefts. State's brief at 16-19. As noted above, both the common 
law and Model Penal Code, upon which the 1973 amendments to the Utah Code were 
patterned, Tuttle, recognize that robbery always involves theft, aggravated by elements of 
violence. See, e.g., Model Penal Code and commentary, Part II. § 222.1, pages 96, supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently recognized that theft is a lesser included 
offense of aggravated robbery. See, e.g., State v. McCovey. 803 P.2d 1234, 1237 and n.16 
(Utah )(1990)(citing Utah cases for the proposition that "theft has been held to be a lesser 
included offense of aggravated robbery because theft, by its very nature, has elements that overlap 
aggravated robbery."). The robbery definition expressly contains theft as an element, Utah 
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Code Ann. § 76-6-301,6 and the robbery part of the code, Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, contains 
no definition section whatsoever, defining theft or any other element of robbery. 
While subsection 76-6-402, which provides the defense and presumption in the theft 
part of the code, states that the presumption "shall be applicable to this part" and that the 
defense exists "under this part," the statute does not expressly indicate that the presumption 
and defense are applicable exclusively in theft cases.7 And in fact, the courts have applied 
the presumption in 76-6-402 not only in theft cases, but also in related cases involving 
robbery and burglary. See State v. Donovan. 294 P. 1108 (Utah 1931)(common law 
6Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 defines robbery as follows: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or 
attempts to take personal property in the possession of another 
from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or 
fear of immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a 
theft" if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of 
theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 provides, 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the 
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor 
is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of this 
subsection shall not include a security interest for the repayment of a debt or 
obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property 
or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to 
obtain or exercise control over the property or service as he did; 
or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or 
service honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have 
consented. 
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presumption would apply in case involving robbery, larceny and burglary); State v. Sessions., 
583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978)(applying statutory presumption in burglary case).8 
As the State's own brief recognizes, in interpreting statutes, Courts have a duty to 
review all related provisions and construe them harmoniously. State's Brief at page 14, 
citing State ex relA.B.. 936 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Utah App. 1997). Particularly in light of the 
basic facts that (a) robberies have always been viewed as thefts aggravated by elements of 
violence (see Model Penal Code commentary), (b) the Utah Supreme Court has always 
viewed theft as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery (McCovey), (c) the Utah 
robbery statute expressly recognizes theft as an element of robbery, and (d) that the robbery 
part of the code provides no independent definition section similar to that provided in the 
theft part of the code, this Court should recognize that the statutory definition of theft, 
requiring proof that the property at issue be that "of another," § 76-6-404, and the statutory 
8 
The State seeks to distinguish State v. Sessions. 583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978), which applies the 
presumption of recently stolen property in the theft part of the code to other crimes, with this 
assertion, 
Section 76-6-402(3)(a) provides that "[i]t is a defense [to theft] that the actor 
..1. [a]cted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved." 
Id. § 76-6-402(3)(a). However, section 76-6-402(2) provides that "[i]t is no 
defense [to theft] that the actor has an interest in the property or service stolen 
if another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe." 
Id. § 76-6-402(2). Here, it is undisputed that the victim had a possessory 
interest in the property defendant sought. Thus, even if Sessions requires 
application of section 76-6-402 to crimes other than theft, section 76-6-402(2) 
of that statute defeats any possible claim-of-right defense under section 76-6-
402(3)(a). 
State's brief at 19. 
The State's assertion that it was undisputed that Hughes had a possessory interest in 
the property Hobbs sought is not supported by citation to the record, (but see Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24 (e) (requiring reference to the record)), nor could it be, given the 
fundamental dispute in this case, the Hobbs was merely trying to collect wages lawfully owed 
him, and unlawfully withheld by Hughes. See Opening Brief of Appellant, Statement of 
Facts, pages 4-6, citing to pages 107,189-195 of the trial transcript, wherein both the state 
and defense witnesses recognized that this case arose when Hobbs came to collect wages 
from Hughes. 
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recognition of the good faith defense in theft cases, § 76-4-402(3), apply in the context of 
robberies to require proof of animus furandi and to permit good faith defenses. See id. 
D. POLICY DECISIONS REMAIN IN THE DOMAIN OF THE LEGISLATURE. 
The State indicates that Utah has appropriately followed modem trends by recognizing 
that proof of animus furandi should no longer be required, and that a good faith defense 
should not be available as a matter of policy, because if the contrary were true, this would 
encourage violence and self help. State's brief at page 17.9 Policy matters remain in the 
domain of the Utah legislature. See, e.g., Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1. 
While some courts from other jurisdictions may frown on good faith defenses, the 
Utah legislature expressly requires proof of animus furandi, recognizes the good faith 
The State complains that counsel for Hobbs quoted an "outdated" version of LaFave for the 
proposition that animus furandi is a required element of robbery and that good faith is a 
defense to robbery charges. State's brief at page 17, n.2. 
The 2000 version of LaFave contains the very same language as the version cited in 
the opening brief: 
The intent to steal (the animus furandi, to use the Latin term) required 
for larceny is the same intent to steal (or, as it is sometimes called, intent to 
rob) needed for robbery. Thus the same factors which negative the intent to 
steal in larceny will negative the intent to rob in robbery - as where the taking 
is under an honest, though, mistaken, claim of ownership of, or claim of a 
lawful right to possess, the property; or where he takes from the victim what 
he honestly, although mistakenly believes the latter owes him (even though he 
may not further believe that violence or intimidation is a proper method of 
collecting debts); or where he takes the victim's property intending (and 
having a substantial ability) to return the very property within a reasonable 
time; or where he is too intoxicated to entertain the specific intent to rob; or 
where he is perpetrating a practical joke. Of course, one who collects debts or 
borrows property or perpetrates jokes by the use of violence or intimidation, 
though he is not guilty of robbery, need not go free: for he is guilty of at least 
simple battery if he uses force, and of simple assault if he uses intimidation; 
and of aggravated assault or battery (e.g. assault with a deadly weapon) under 
appropriate circumstances. 
LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law (2000), Chapter 8, § 11, pages 866-868 (footnotes omitted). 
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defense in theft cases, and incorporates theft into the statute defining robbery, thus 
condoning non-violent self help. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402.10 Requiring proof 
of animus furandi and permitting good faith defenses in robbery cases does not encourage 
violence, because the Utah legislature has enacted numerous provisions that continue to 
punish violent behavior, including numerous statutes proscribing various forms of assault. 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1. Accord, People v. Hughes. 39 P. 492, 
493-94 (Utah 1895)(indicating that regardless of whatever other offense the defendant 
committed in collecting a perceived debt, absent proof of animus furandi, he was not 
properly convicted of robbery). 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN EXCLUDING THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE 
NEGATING ANIMUS FURANDI, 
SUPPORTING HOBBS' GOOD FAITH DEFENSE, 
AND BEARING ON HUGHES' MOTIVE IN ACCUSING HOBBS. 
Section 76-6-402 provides, 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the 
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor 
is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of this 
subsection shall not include a security interest for the repayment of a debt or 
obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property 
or service involved: or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to 
obtain or exercise control over the property or service as he did: 
QL 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or 




A. THE EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE ON THE ISSUES OF ANIMUS FURANDI 
AND GOOD FAITH. 
The State contends that evidence of Hughes' history of cheating his employees, and 
facts underlying wages owed to Hobbs by Hughes were irrelevant because Utah law does not 
recognize a good faith defense to robbery charges. State's brief at 23. As is explained in 
Points I and II of this brief, the good faith defense and animus furandi element of the robbery 
charge both require and permit inquiry into the merits of the pay dispute, and thus, the 
evidence was relevant. See id; Opening Brief of Appellant, Point II, pages 22 through 33. 
B. THE EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW HUGHES' BIAS IN ACCUSING 
HOBBS. 
The State claims that Hobbs waived the contention that the evidence of Hughes' 
history of extremely dishonest business practices bore on Hughes' bias and motive in 
accusing Hobbs of robbery, and led the court into error. State's brief at 20-25. By reviewing 
the record, which is truncated by the State in its brief to the point of prejudicial inaccuracy, 
the Court will see that counsel did not waive this claim or lead the trial court into error. 
Following the presentation of the State's case, the jury was excused, and the trial court 
asked defense counsel if her desire to present evidence concerning Hughes' business 
practices was motivated solely by her desire to present a good faith defense to the robbery 
charge (T. 214). Defense counsel told the court he was half correct, and when asked, 
elaborated as follows, 
Well, I think, your Honor, it also goes to credibility. Somebody who is 
consistently not paying consistent with the hours that their employee works, 
I think that is - that lends itself to somebody who is credible or not credible, 
truthful or not truthful, and it's a form of cheating. 
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(T. 214-215). After discussing the rules of evidence which limit evidence on credibility, the 
court indicated that perhaps the evidence would be admissible if Hobbs was raising a 
"fantastic" defense imagined by the court. The court stated, 
If the theory is that Mr. Hughes has this elaborate scheme to defraud his 
employees with respect to their pay and then when they come in to get the 
money he set them up by having them leave their guns in his office and then 
when they pick up the gun to take it he acts like they're trying to rob him or he 
just seizes that opportunity to act like he's being robbed and make a big deal 
of it, if that's the defense you want to run Here, I suppose you're entitled to 
get into the billing practices to some extent to support that defense.... 
(T.216). 
Later the same day, defense counsel clarified that the court's fantastic defense was not 
what Hobbs intended to present, but that he did want to present evidence concerning Hughes' 
business practices to show that he overreacted to Hobbs' efforts to collect his wages. She 
stated, 
I think you asked me a question about our defense. And the way you presented 
it or understood it is inconsistent with what it is, that there are some things that 
are sort of correct. And I'm wondering if the court is seeking some 
clarification from me about what it would have been had the court not ruled to 
keep the evidence out. 
(T. 221-222). After the court asked her what relevance the evidence had, other than to show 
Hobbs' good faith, counsel explained, 
What Mr. Hobbs wanted in terms of placing that evidence before the 
jury and before the court is to paint a picture of what was going on. Not to 
show that there was some scheme on Mr. Hughes' behalf to set him up, that 
was not his intention to have that be his defense. What he wanted, the picture 
he wanted to paint was this is a business that consistently mismanages funds, 
doesn't pay employees correctly, has problems as a result of that with the 
Internal Revenue Service or other disputes, employees complaining about 
missing wages, and that when he stood in that office that day and threatened 
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a lawsuit, some of Mr. Hughes' reaction to that was overreaction based on his 
upset about the situation in general and about his threats of suing him.... 
(T. 223). 
The trial court acknowledged the desired defense, that "this is an overreaction by Mr. 
Hughes, Mr. Hobbs never intended all this," the court asked counsel to explain how 
"slipshod or even shady payroll practices" pertained to the defense (T. 223). Defense counsel 
elaborated, 
The connection would be that when Mr. Hobbs was standing in his 
office - or sitting in his office and arguing with him about the payroll situation 
and threatening to suejhim and threatening to contact the Internal Revenue 
Service or whomever, that that was already a sensitive subject, that that pushed 
somebody who was already involved in ongoing disputes by employees who 
were saying, "You haven't paid me the right amount, you haven't paid me 
enough, we've got a problem," over the edge. That he was somebody who was 
very sensitive to that compliant because he had heard it quite a bit and that 
that's partial basis for his overreaction that day. 
(T. 223-224). When the court asked the prosecutor to respond, the court rejected the 
prosecutor's argument that the evidence was irrelevant, stating, 
Isn't there at least some conceivable connection between an overreaction and 
there already being some sensitivity on the subject, Mr. Benge? Or is it just 
completely irrelevant? Doesn't it tend to show - if they brought in 50 past 
employees to testify that they had payroll disputes with him and he's got yet 
another one that now is going to take it to the IRS and — 
(T. 224-225). 
After the prosecutor argued that any potential relevance was outweighed by prejudice, 
the trial court agreed, first detailing the potential length of the trial delving into Hobbs' 
entitlement to the money and the history of Hughes' business practices, and then stating, 
But - and then we get into the grievances that other employees have. 
And that may all tend to show a special sensitivity on Mr. Hughes' part, but it 
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does so at the cost of a considerable amount of time, introducing the potential 
for confusion of the issues, delay, and I just don't think it's worth - and some 
possible prejudice, I guess, to Mr. Hughes that he ends up being put on trial 
when he's the alleged victim in this case and he isn't in control of the 
prosecution. I just think that if it has any relevance it's not sufficient to justify 
the risk of confusion, unfair prejudice to Mr. Hughes, and the time that we'd 
consume in doing it. And so I'm not going to allow you to get into that. 
(T. 226). 
In sum, while defense counsel did not use the particular words bias or motive in 
seeking the admission of the evidence, the trial court was fully aware and clear that the 
defense intended to show that Hughes' interpretation of Hobbs' non-forceful efforts to 
collect his wages as a robbery was an overreaction that was not intended by Hobbs but was 
prompted in part by Hughes' history of cheating his employees (T. 223). The court initially 
offered to let Hobbs present evidence of the far-fetched hypothetical defense conjured up by 
the court, that Hughes set Hobbs and his employees up by having them store their guns in 
their offices and then fabricating robbery charges against them when they came to get the 
wages he was withholding (T. 216), the court did not offer to let counsel present evidence 
of Hughes true business practices with Hobbs and other employees, but ruled that the 
relevance of the evidence was outweighed by concerns about time consumption, confusion 
and prejudice to Mr. Hughes (T. 226). 
Thus, there was no waiver of the defense efforts to have the evidence admitted, and 
defense counsel certainly did not invite or lead the court to rule as he did. 
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IV. 
THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
The State claims that any claim of error based on the absence of robbery elements in 
the aggravated robbery instruction was waived, and is specious in any event, because the 
aggravated robbery elements instruction included the word robbery, and the robbery 
definition instruction included the elements to robbery. State's brief at 26 to 27. 
Aggravated robbery is not a crime defined by one element, robbery, but is a crime with 
multiple elements, including the taking of another's property. See, e.g., State v. Brooks. 
supra, 908 P.2d at 862. 
As this Court is undoubtedly aware, the absence of an accurate elements instruction 
constitutes plain error, and the fact that a different instruction correctly defines a crime does 
not substitute for the essential accurate elements instruction. See, e.g., State v. Jones. 823 
P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1992) (court accepted State's concession tliat despite the fact that 
information instruction correctly stated definition of aggravated kidnaping, absence of an 
accurate elements instruction was plain error under State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980)). 
The State contends that the robbery statute does not require proof that Hobbs knew 
or intended an unlawful taking. State's brief at 27. It is elementary that the prosecution must 
prove mens rea for each element of any offense charged, unless the offense involves strict 
liability. State v. Elton. 680 P.2d 727, 728-29 (Utah 1984). Accordingly, the instructions 
given should have informed the jury that the government had to prove the intentional mens 
rea with respect to each element, including that Hobbs attempted to unlawfully take the 
property of Hughes from Hughes. See, e.g., Elton: Hughes: Brooks. 
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The State maintains that the trial court correctly instructed the jury in the robbery 
definition instruction, "I can not assert as a defense to a charge of robbery that I believe that 
the other person owes me money." (R. 143). State's brief at 28. As is detailed in Points I 
and II of this brief, there is a good faith defense in robbery and aggravated robbery cases, and 
in order to obtain convictions of these offenses, the government must require proof of animus 
furandi, or that the property at issue was not Hobbs.' Accordingly, the jury instruction 
negating the State's burden of proof of animus furandi and foreclosing a good faith defense 
was error. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Hobbs maintains all arguments originally asserted in his opening brief, and seeks 
reversal of his conviction by this Court. 
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